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Bioethics with a Human Facet 
CARL E. SCHNEIDER• 
Perhaps in ethics, the true route begins with practice, with 
deeds and doers, and moves only secondarily to reflection on 
practice. . . . Moreover, because this sort of philosophical 
reflection mirrors genuine conduct, ethics would not become 
wholly or purely abstract, would never reach 'to what we call 
ethical theory, because it would retain its connection with the 
concreteness and complexities of the moral life and the moral 
agent. 
Leon R. Kass 
Practicing Ethics 
What matters a great deal more is the fact that it was flimsily 
based, as I now think, on an a priori view of what human 
nature is like, both other people's and our own, which was 
disastrously mistaken. 
John Maynard Keynes 
My Early Beliefs 
This Article and the successor article I will shortly publish grow out of one 
reaction I have had to years of reading bioethical and legal literature. 1 Let me 
begin by putting the point in its simplest, even crudest, form: That literature 
too often discusses the problems of health care in so disembodied and 
denatured a way that the patients and physicians, the family and friends, the 
dread and the disease are quite abstracted from the scene. The result is a 
literature that critically limits itself and that crucially oversimplifies the issues 
it confronts. 
t © 1994 by Carl E. Schneider. All rights reserved. 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
This Article began in a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Poynter Center and the 
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. Other versions of that paper were presented at the 
Fifth Annual Bioethics Summer Retreat, at the Program for Society and Medicine, University of 
Michigan Medical School, and at a faculty workshop at the Arizona State University Law School. I am 
grateful to audiences at all these venues for their attentive and acute comments. I particularly benefitted 
from the iiiuminating responses to the paper I gave at the Indiana University symposium of Bernice H. 
Pescosolido and Peter Cherbas. I am also glad to be able to thank Renee R. Anspach, Alfred F. Conard, 
Joel Howeii, Stanton D. Krauss, James Lindeman Nelson, Martin Pemick, Carl J. Schneider, Dorothy 
Schneider, Joan W. Schneider, and Carol Weisbrod for their perceptive and penetrating comments on 
earlier drafts of this manuscript Finally, I am especially indebted to my colleagues and coiiaborators, 
Patricia D. White and Lee E. Teitelbaum, not just for their characteristically generous and thoughtful 
comments on this paper, but also for the ideas-too numerous and too integral to credit individual-
ly-which they have contributed to it As they know, much in this paper grew out of the empirical 
project in which we are jointly engaged on how patients make medical decisions and out of our many 
conversations on these disturbing and absorbing topics. 
1. In the highly interdisciplinary (or perhaps only motley) field of bioethics, it can be useful to 
confess one's disciplinary background. I write from the perspective of the academic lawyer. 
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There are, of course, reasons bioethical and even legal literature might tend 
to abstract people from its problems. Bioethics is, in part, a subset of ethics, 
and it is, in part, peopled by philosophers. It is a field and those are scholars 
whose special calling is to undertake abstract analyses of human dilemmas. 
And as Brody observes, the prominent analytic tradition in philosophy "has 
been powerful in condemning anecdotal or ad hoc reasoning as hopelessly 
subjective or intuitionistic and in insisting that reason in ethics requires that 
conclusions be logically deduced from more general principles."2 Compound-
ing this attention to the abstract is the philosopher's absorption with the 
normative, his desire, as James L. Nelson puts it, "not to ask what people 
want, as much as it is to ask what they should want. "3 
But even the abstract analysis of human problems cannot safely become too 
far detached from the reality of those problems, from the insistent complexity 
of human life. Further, bioethics, to say nothing of law, is also very much the 
study of applied ethics, and its practitioners include people-like doctors, 
lawyers, and ethicists employed by hospitals-who must be as concerned with 
empirics as ethics. 4 
Yet another force helps explain why the literature of bioethics and law has 
tended toward the abstract. Historically, bioethics has been vitally driven by 
a desire to tame the imperialism and arrogance of medicine. As is common 
in political battles, simple and forceful statements have worked better than 
complex and guarded ones. More specifically, a powerfully stated and 
too-often simple autonomy paradigm has become the central feature of 
bioethical thought and law. Yet, despite the undoubted and true importance 
of that paradigm, its reiteration has become stale, flat, and unprofitable, and 
its simplicities have become too costly. 
Thus, in this Article, I try first to describe the "hyper-rationalism" of 
bioethics and of the law regulating the relationship between doctor and patient 
and then offer one way to treat that ailment. Hyper-rationalism is the tendency 
to believe, first, that people behave in ways that can so far be predicted a 
priori that empirical evidence about their behavior is superfluous and, second, 
that people think and act rationalistically, seeking always to maximize and 
exercise autonomy. Hyper-rationalism has contributed regrettably to a 
simplifying of bioethical and legal thought, to treating people as though they 
want essentially the same kinds of things and go about getting them in 
2. HOW~ BRODY, STORIES OF SICKNESS 144 (1987). 
3. Private communication. 
4. And so some of them have been, sometimes and to some extent. For instance, a standard 
introduction to bioethics-TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (3d ed. 1989}-cites some of the leading empirical studies and provides a generous sampling 
of case studies. The problem of informed consent has produced particular attention to the empirical 
aspects of a bioethical problem. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL 
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical 
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379 (1990); Alan 
Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique 
of the Empirical Studies, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 265 (1983). 
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essentially the same kinds of ways, to a view that human behavior is 
characterized by a predominantly logical approach to life's perplexities. 
At this stage in the history of bioethics and law, we should be ready, and 
we surely need, to see the core problems of bioethics in all the factual and 
moral complexity of reality. I will argue that empirical research provides one 
useful way to bring more of that complexity back in. To illustrate concretely 
the usefulness of such research I will describe a literature which provocatively 
indicates that a substantial number of patients do not wish to make their own 
medical decisions. I will suggest that this literature raises questions that 
should cause us to think more deeply, rigorously, and richly about the 
problems of bioethics in general and about its autonomy paradigm in 
particular. Indeed, so fruitful are this literature and those questions that they 
cannot be cabined within a single article. Thus I will explore them at length 
in a subsequent piece. 
I. STATING THE PROBLEM 
[The rationalist] does not neglect experience, but he often appears to do so 
because ... of the rapidity with which he reduces the tangle and variety 
of experience to a set of principles which he will then attack or defend 
only upon rational grounds. He has no sense of the cumulation of 
experience, only of the readiness of experience when it has been converted 
into a formula . . . . 
Michael Oakeshott 
Rationalism in Politics 
It is no doubt true that you cannot get from is to ought. But you ought to 
know what is is before you say what ought ought to be. And many of us who 
write about bioethics can have only a faint sense of what that is is. Most of 
us are not doctors. 5 All of us are patients, but few of us are unfortunate 
enough to have wide personal dealings with doctors and hospitals. All of 
us-doctors, patients, lawyers, and ethicists-have readily to hand only our 
own limited and thus misleading experiences. 
Bioethicists, like lawyers, constantly confront the danger of what I once 
called "hyper-rationalism."6 Hyper-rationalism has both a methodological and 
a substantive aspect. In its former aspect, "[h]yper-rationalism is essentially 
the substitution of reason for information and analysis. It has two components: 
first, the belief that reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence 
is unavailable or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts 
through a [narrow] set of artificial analytic categories."7 Hyper-rationalism, 
5. And doctors seem curiously committed to an anecdotal approach to social and ethical issues. 
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETIIICS 
TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 7 (1991). 
6. Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH. 
L. REv. 919, 932-37 (1986). 
7. ld. at 932. As Fox says ofbioethics: 
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in other words, tempts us to believe that we can understand how people think 
and act merely by reasoning, and not by investigating. Hyper-rationalism 
seductively justifies discussing human behavior without doing the empirical 
work necessary to discover how people actually behave. Hyper-rationalism is 
the conceptualist's revenge for the world's complexity. 
Methodological hyper-rationalism, I have said, offers a rationale for a way 
of understanding and writing about social problems. Substantive hyper-
rationalism furnishes the assumptions about how people think and act that 
stand in for the information that might be garnered from empirical work. In 
bioethics, as in many other areas of human thought, 8 these assumptions see 
people as operating in highly rationalistic ways. They hold that people 
deliberate explicitly about their situations, that they do so in predominantly 
rational terms, that they are autonomy maximizers,9.and that they have well-
worked-out agendas which they need autonomy to maximize. The hyper-
rationalists' assumptions further see people primarily as makers of decisions, 
reaching out for control over their lives. 1° Finally, while they do not always 
entirely abstract people from the social settings in which they live, they tend 
to simplify those settings radically. 11 
Combined, the assumptions of hyper-rationalism conduce to a view of 
human nature that airbrushes out life's complexity and that sees human nature 
and conduct as verging on the uniform. As Brody observes, "Some statements 
in the medical ethics literature suggest that there is basically one way to be 
sick, that sickness affects all sick individuals in this one way, and that 
[O]rdered, cerebral annchair inquiry is given precedence, partly because the formalistic "data" 
it generates more closely fit the norms of bioethical logic and rationality than information 
gathered through first-hand research. Thought experiments are one of an array of cognitive 
techniques used in bioethics to distance and abstract itself from the human settings in which 
ethical questions are embedded and experienced, reduce their complexity and ambiguity, limit 
the number and kinds of morally relevant factors to be dealt with, dispel dilemmas, and siphon 
off the emotion, suffering, bewilderment, and tragedy that many medical moral predicaments 
entail for patients, families, and medical professionals. 
Renee C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, Medical Morality Is Not Bioethics, in ESSAYS IN MEDICAL 
SOCIOLOGY 645, 666 (1988). Or as one distinguished bioethicist observes, "[I]n the fields of medical 
ethics and bioethics, the theoretical views of Kant, Mill, and others are often invoked to give answers 
to clinical problems that the principles' abstract formulations cannot provide." JAY KATZ, THE SILENT 
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 107 (1984). 
8. Economics, of course, comes immediately but not exclusively to mind. For a sustained criticism 
of this aspect of social science thinking, see AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW 
ECONOMICS {1988). 
9. As the anthropologist Robert Murphy puts it, "The problems of dependence versus 
independence, of contingency versus autonomy, are not restricted to American culture--they are a 
universal aspect of all social relationships. The ability to survive on one's own and to maximize self-
determination are essential ingredients of the basic drive to live." ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BoDY 
SILENT 202 (1990). 
10. Etzioni associates this attitude with the "undersocialized view." That view "is closely linked to 
the enlightenment notion, which is very sanguine about an individual's ability to reason. It assumes that 
people set their own goals, in neatly patterned ways, and the ways they pursue their goals are open to 
evidence and to inferences drawn logically .... " ETZIONI, supra note 8, at 13. 
II. For criticisms of law's hyper-rationality, see Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the 
Channeling Function in Privacy Law, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97 (Stephen E. 
Gottlieb ed., 1993); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: 
An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1988). 
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therefore one can usefully generalize, for ethical purposes, among all such 
cases without inquiring too finely into the details."12 Similarly, the law of 
bioethics operates in capacious but undiscriminating categories. The duty of 
informed consent, for example, applies by its terms to all but a few medical 
decisions (those involving medical emergencies or patients who would be 
injured by a disclosure). As Schuck writes, "[w]ith some relatively narrow 
exceptions the law treats all patients and physicians the same; it posits an 
abstracted, objectively defined 'prudent patient' as the consumer of informa-
tion and the maker of choices, and conforms all physicians' legal obligations 
to this uniform abstraction."13 
Hyper-rationalism's assumptions also conduce to the view that patients 
make decisions in highly rationalistic ways. Even some work in medical 
sociology and social psychology is not immune from this defect. Thus Janis 
writes: 
The theoretical concepts that have been dominant in the literature on 
decision making for over 25 years are based on cognitive theories, such as 
'game theory' and 'subjective expected utility' (SEU) theory, which assume 
that people make deliberate choices on a rational basis, taking account of 
the values and the probabilities of the consequences to be expected from 
choosing each of the available alternatives. 14 
As empiricists in fields ranging from sociology to psychology to anthropology 
have been at pains to show, this view exaggerates human rationality and 
understates the role of social and cultural factors in patients' lives.15 
If students of human behavior have too often succumbed to this conse-
quence of hyper-rationalism, we should not be surprised to find lawyers and 
bioethicists following suit.16 Consider, for instance, how they seem to believe 
people should and can make decisions. The AMA, for instance, has thought 
that the "decision whether to permit or to perform a transplantation procedure 
... must be a reasoned, intellectual decision, not an emotional decision.'m 
Or, as one influential bioethicist writes, "Consent must be voluntary and 
12. BRODY, supra note 2, at 144. He continues, "The extreme form of such a statement is something 
like 'All illness represents a state of diminished autonomy'· • •. . "!d. (quoting M. S. Komrad, A Defence 
of Medical Paternalism: Maximising Patients' Autonomy, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 38 (1983)). 
13. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Infonned Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 957 (1994). 
14. Irving L. Janis, The Patient as Decision Maker, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE 326, 
327 (W. Doyle Gentry ed., 1984). 
15. For an instructive survey of those criticisms, see Ronald C. Kessler et al., Social Psychology 
and Health, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Karen Cook et al. eds., 1994). 
For explorations of the limits on human rationality in making decisions, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN ET AL., 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982). For an exploration of the emotional 
context of human decisions, with special attention to the problems of medical patients, see IRVING L. 
JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND 
CoMMITMENT 16 (1977). For a first-rate treatment of the social context of one kind of medical decision, 
see Bernice A. Pescosolido, Beyond Rational Choice: The Social Dynamics of How People Seek Help, 
97 AM. J. Soc. 1096, 1106-07 (1992). 
16. For a particularly good examination of the tendency of modem bioethics to abstract problems 
from their human and social reality and to think in hyper-rationalistic terms about them, see Leon R. 
Kass, Practicing Ethics: Where's the Action?, HAsTINGs CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1990; at 5. 
17. American Medical Association Judicial Council, Ethical Guidelines for Organ Transplantation 
205 JAMA 341 (1968). 
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free-the product of deliberative reflection on all possible courses of 
action. " 18 Or again, as two other influential bioethicists suggest, "Autonomy 
requires that individuals critically assess their own values and preferences; 
determine whether they are desirable; affirm, upon reflection, these values as 
ones that should justify their actions; and then be free to initiate action to 
realize the values."19 
Hyper-rationalism's substantive assumptions could be true, but that has 
hardly been demonstrated. And they are much likelier to be false. Their 
picture of human nature is far too simple, far too disembodied to be 
convincing. They present a bloodless, flat, distant, abstract, depersonalized, 
impoverished view of the way people think, feel, and act, of the social 
circumstances in which people live, of the ethical lives they lead. And hyper-
rationalism's simplifications are particularly injurious in bioethics, a field that 
treats people in their least rational moments, in their most emotional travails, 
in their most contextual complexity. 
Hyper-rationalism, of course, has its uses. It promotes the kind of 
generalization that frees courts and commentators to reason logically about the 
normative problems that are, after all, one of their central concerns. And some 
simplification of life's complexity is surely necessary if human problems are 
to be handled practically and promptly, if comprehensible rules are to be 
devised, if useful precedent is to be developed. But bioethicists and lawyers 
should want to insinuate as much of that complexity as possible into their 
normative discourse. A failure to do so perilously distances norms from the 
people and circumstances they seek to govern and serve. 
This is a peril with which law is all too familiar. Indeed, one of the most 
illuminating bodies of modem legal writing is the scholarship which makes 
sport of the idea (that seems so natural and right to lawyers and law 
professors) that the law makes rules and that people know about them, accept 
them, and respond to them in a considered and rational way. The seminal and 
classic work in this sobering genre is Stewart Macaulay's Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study.20 
Macaulay interviewed suppliers and purchasers in Wisconsin to see how 
they used contracts and how the law of contracts influenced them. He found 
that firms did not conceive of themselves as using contract law (even when, 
in legal terms, they were) and that disputes were "frequently settled without 
reference to the contract or potential or actual legal sanctions."21 Quite the 
contrary, businessmen relied on their own system of norms and on informal 
sanctions. As one of them crushingly said, '"You don't rea.d legalistic contract 
clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run 
18. Arthur L. Caplan, Informed Consent and Provider/Patient Relationships in Rehabilitation 
Medicine, in IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A PANCREAS? 240, 245 (1992). 
19. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 
267 JAMA 2221, 2225 (1992). 
20. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. 
REv. 36, 55 (1963). 
21. !d. at 61. 
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So far, I have made a general case that in our thinking about legal and 
bioethical issues, we are prone to a hyper-rationalism that distorts our 
understanding of reality ·and that thus warps our normative thinking. I have 
further argued that empirical research can help mend these defects. But the 
best way of demonstrating the usefulness of the approach I advocate is by 
example. Therefore, I will now briefly explore some of the hyper-rationalistic 
assumptions on which the law of bioethics has relied. Then, I will draw 
attention to a body of empirical data that raises provocative and stimulating 
questions about those assumptions. 
I begin with the centerpiece of bioethics-its autonomy paradigm. 
"Paradigms," Kuhn suggests, "gain their status because they are more 
successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of 
practitioners has come to recognize as acute."46 Bioethics was born out of 
a crisis of imperialism in biomedical research and medical treatment.47 It is 
thus unsurprising that, as Fox writes, "from the outset, the conceptual 
framework of bioethics has accorded paramount status to the value-complex 
of individualism, underscoring the principles of individual rights, autonomy, 
self-determination, and their legal expression in the jurisprudential notion of 
privacy."48 Even where the issue is the just allocation of scarce resources, 
"[t]he view of distributive justice underlying it is structured around an 
individual, rights-oriented conception of the general or common good, in 
which greater importance is assigned to equity than to equality."49 
Of course, describing any field's paradigm is challenging, and bioethics' 
paradigm is particularly elusive because that subject is compounded from 
several diverse fields. Further, it is divided between "advocates" and 
"academics" (although it is a passionate field, and sometimes one can scarcely 
tell the two groups apart). 50 As one might anticipate, the academics tend to 
articulate the autonomy paradigm with greater sophistication, care, and 
subtlety than the advocates. 51 But "no important thought achieves social 
power undegraded."52 The intricate and somber refinement of a Freud is soon 
46. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (1970). It is difficult for 
a late twentieth-century academic to think about the development of a field of scholarship without 
adverting to Kuhn's magisterial work. Perhaps that work applies better to scientific scholarship than to 
scholarship in other fields. Perhaps it applies with some awkwardness to a field simultaneously as deeply 
theoretical and as frankly practical as bioethics. Perhaps it does not even satisfactorily describe all 
scientific work. But it has enormous resonance, and it will prove a useful point of embarkation. For a 
recent survey of Kuhn's work, see PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE, RECONSTRUCTING SCIENTIFIC 
REvOLUTIONS: THOMAS S. KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1993). 
47. For the story of the origins ofbioethics, see DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: 
A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991). 
48. Fox, supra note 42, at 206. 
49.Id. 
50. On this division, see Daniel Wikler, What Has Bioethics to Offer Health Policy?, 69 MILBANK 
Q. 233 (1991). 
51. For example, Beauchamp and Childress labor to make it clear that there is more to bioethics 
than the autonomy paradigm. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 4. 
52. Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. 
L. REv. 1803, 1846 (1985). 
1086 
,INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1075 
transmuted into the remtsstve banalities of psychobabble.53 The cautious 
complexities of constitutional rights doctrine are readily debased into 
arguments that professional baseball players have a constitutional right to 
chew tobacco while playing ball. Thus the advocate's blunter versions are in 
some ways the more consequential formulations of the paradigm, since it is 
they that dominate the world in which medical policies are formulated and 
social decisions are made and which are likeliest to beguile the public mind. 
In any event, there is no doubt about the triumph of the autonomy 
paradigm. As Caplan observes, "there are relatively few bioethicists who 
argue that respect for autonomy is not the preeminent value governing the 
actions of health-care providers."54 He continues colorfully, 
The Freddy Kruger of bioethics for the better part of two decades has been the 
doctor who pushes his or her values onto the patient .... This devil has been 
completely exorcised and a large part of contemporary bioethics scholarship seems 
to be devoted to the task of assuring that the paternalistic doctor stays dead and 
buried ... . 55 
It is perfectly true that in that most canonical expression of bioethic's 
paradigms-what is jocularly called the Georgetown mantra-other consider-
ations are recited. However, it is abundantly plain which principle predomi-
nates: A.nd now abideth beneficence, social justice, and autonomy, these three; 
but the greatest of these is autonomy. Thus, Fox observes that even the 
"benefiting of others advocated in bioethical thought is circumscribed by 
respectful deference to individual rights, interests, and autonomy; and 
minimizing the harm done to individuals is more greatly accentuated than the 
maximization of either personal or collective good."56 
In my own field-the law governing medicine-it has been said that 
"Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-
determination."57 Certainly autonomy has enjoyed an increasingly expansive 
role in that law during the life span of bioethics. The doctrine of informed 
consent, it is worth remembering, is essentially an innovation of the last three 
decades. 58 In recent years, numerous state legislatures have labored to 
enhance patients' autonomy by authorizing various kinds of advance 
directives. Similarly, Congress a few years ago enacted the Patient Self 
Determination Act, which basically requires hospitals and nursing homes to 
53. See, e.g., PHILIP RIEFF, FREUD: THE MIND OF THE MORALIST (1979); PHILIP RIEFF, THE 
TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH AFTER FREUD (1966). 
54. See, e.g., Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 257. 
55. ld. at 259. 
56. Fox, supra note 42, at 206-07. 
57. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). 
58. For a somewhat tendentious history of that doctrine, see KA1Z, supra note 7, at 41-84. For a 
well informed and more complex view of that history, see Martin S. Pemick, The Patient's Role in 
Medical Decisionmaldng: A Social History of Informed Consent in Medical Therapy, in MAKING 
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE 
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP (3 President's Cornm. for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1982) [hereinafter President's Cornm.]. 
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to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave decent-
ly. •"22 
Another illuminating study reaching much the same kind of conclusion 
about the relevance of law's assumptions and forms to people's lives is 
Robert C. Ellickson's striking study of ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, 
California.23 Ellickson set out to test the Coase Theorem's principle that 
people will reach an economically efficient solution to their disputes whatever 
the law's allocation of tort liability. Ellickson found that the allocation of 
liability actually does not matter when wandering cattle damage a farmer's 
crops, but not because people bargain to achieve economic efficiency. Rather, 
disputes are generally avoided in the service of an informally accepted norm 
of neighborliness and reciprocity, a norm enforced by the community's own 
homemade informal sanctions. 24 
In short, a chastening literature "reveals that, to the lawyer's chagrin, 
businesses resist using contracts, ranchers do not know what rules of liability 
govern damage done by wandering cattle, suburbanites do not summon the 
law to resolve neighborhood disputes, engaged couples do not know the law 
governing how they will own property when they marry, citizens repeatedly 
reject the due process protections proffered them, and, what is worse, all these 
people simply don't care what the law says."25 This literature vividly 
demonstrates the perils of the hyper-rationalist approach even in areas like 
commercial life, which might be thought safe places to apply it. 
The law regulating medicine abounds in its own examples of this provoking 
phenomenon. For example, the law's principal bioethical reforms have been 
used far less than their advocates anticipated and hoped. Caplan reports, for 
instance, "No more than 10 percent of the population has either a living will 
or a durable power of attorney."26 He adds, "Similarly dismal statistics are 
reported for the practices surrounding the issuance of DNR (do-not-resusci-
tate), DNI (do-not-intubate), and DNT (do-not-treat) orders in hospitals and 
nursing homes."27 Thus one study found that "the enactment of DNR 
legislation in the State of New York appears to have had little effect on the 
frequency of CPR and on the degree of patient or family involvement in the 
22./d. 
23. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES (1991). 
24. Id. For further accounts and analyses of this literature, see ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., IN THE 
INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); Lynn A. Baker & 
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce 
at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993); Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: 
WISdom and Legitimacy in Family Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1986); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking 
Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 203-09; Carl E. Schneider, 
Social Structure and Social Control: On the Moral Order of a Suburb, 24 L. & Soc. REv. 875 (1990). 
25. Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics in the Language of the Law, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (forthcoming 
1994). 
26. Arthur L. Caplan, Can Autonomy Be Saved?, in IF I WERE A RICH MAN COULD I BUY A 
PANCREAS? 256, 261 (1992) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Can Autonomy Be Saved?]. 
27./d. 
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DNR decision at our institution."28 Caplan also argues that the experiment 
of organ-donor cards "has been a failure," since despite the nearly universal 
provision of a donor form on the back of one's driver's license, "no more 
than 20 percent of all Americans have signed it."29 And Caplan reviews a 
number of studies that "indicate that despite the enactment of legislation in 
forty-four states requiring requests to be made of family members about organ 
and tissue donation when someone dies in a hospital setting, more than a third 
of all hospitals never do so, and an even larger number do so only sporadical-
1 "30 y. 
Similarly, there is evidence that, despite the love and labor that have been 
poured into it, the law of informed consent rarely results in significant 
verdicts for plaintiffs, since "few patients Sjle physicians in general, even 
fewer sue claiming lack of informed consent, and yet fewer prevail on that 
theory."31 One prominent scholar concludes glumly that that law "has had 
little impact on patients' decision-making either in legal theory or medical 
practice."32 Some substantiation of this lies in the fact that "the empirical 
and anecdotal studies of patients who refuse treatment almost never portray 
the process of obtaining informed consent as playing a causative role."33 
A disjunction between the law's assumptions and the realities of practice 
may be seen in yet other areas of medical law. Frequent and menacing though 
tort suits may seem to doctors, "for every 8 potentially valid claims, only 1 
claim [is] actually filed."34 Indeed, "[e]ven when we narrowed our focus to 
the more serious and 'valuable' tort claims-iatrogenic injuries to patients 
under seventy that produced disabilities (including death) lasting six months 
or more-we still found that for every 3 such events there was only I tort 
payment."35 Finally, there is (perhaps reassuring) evidence that "the exis-
tence of Good Samaritan legislation made no difference to the willingness of 
physicians to stop and assist."36 
This literature, then, should alert us to the dangers of hyper-rationalism, to 
the perils of believing unaided ratiocination can allow us to understand how 
people conceive of their problems, organize their lives, resolve their disputes, 
and respond to legal ~orms. But what is the antidote to hyper-rationalism? 
There are several. For instance, Brody writes that philosophy of medicine 
"can indeed advance by ... abstract discussions; but it can advance only so 
28. Russell S. Kamer et al., Effect of New York State's Do-Not-Resuscitate Legislation on In-
Hospital Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Practice, 88 AM. J. MED. 108, 109-10 (1990):;,: 
29. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 262-63. ''-?f, <: 
30. Id. at 265. ---
31. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 46. 
32. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PIIT: L. REV. 137, 139 (1977). 
33. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 202. 
34. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACllCE ON TRIAL 13 (1991). 
35. ld. 
36. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 187 (2d ed. 
1991). I do not mean to suggest that it is only lawyers who see the world through distorting lenses. For 
an examination of the misperceptions doctors often have of the law, see Marshall B. Kapp & Bernard 
Lo, Legal Perceptions and Medical Decision Making, 64 MILBANK Q. 163 (1986). 
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far. At some point we will require a richer context for the discussion to 
proceed fruitfully. This context can be provided by stories of sickness."37 
This attractive and profitable solution, of course, has its formal, well-
established, and central counterparts. Casuistry is an ancient and still 
honorable mode of ethical discourse. 38 And cases lie at the very heart of our 
common-law and constitutional method. But necessary though those methods 
surely are, they are not by themselves sufficient. Too much depends on the 
way the case is selected for study, on the richness of the problems the case 
presents, on the amount of information that can be obtained about it. And 
ultimately, a single case, or even a few cases, must be unrepresentative of the 
sweep of cases the world invariably spawns. 
We need, then, to inhabit all the mansions available in the house of 
bioethics. And among the most deserted of those mansions is that of empirical 
research. Judicial opinions dealing with bioethical issues rarely deal 
thoroughly with empirical evidence, or even with what effect judicial 
doctrines have. As Schuck notes, for example, "the cases evince little 
systematic judicial interest in the [informed consent] doctrine's actual 
consequences, especially its costs. Instead, courts tend to invoke the values 
of autonomy and improved decisionmaking and then analyze the implications 
of those values .... "39 Similarly, "[i]n Tarasoff [ v. Regents of the Universi-
ty of California40], as in other well known tort decisions, a court announced 
a rule designed to change private behavior without reliable data regarding the 
practices it was intending to change, the extent of the problem it was trying 
to remedy, or the costs which the proposed cure would impose."41 Commen-
tators are perhaps less prone to this failing, but it is still easy to find lengthy 
articles, to say nothing of books, on bioethical issues which are unbesmirched 
by data. 
Yet such research offers a breadth, rigor, and precision of understanding 
that is available in no other way. It provides a disciplined way of reviewing 
our assumptions and a systematic means of identifying neglected issues. In 
sum, empirical research provides a fruitful means of winning a more detailed, 
complex, and accurate picture of what patients want, think, and do which can 
deepen-and darken-our understanding of bioethical problems.42 
All this being said, let· me be the first to acknowledge the inevitable and 
substantial difficulty of drawing solid conclusions about the psychological and 
37. BRODY, supra note 2, at x. For further ruminations of the centrality of stories in medicine, see, 
e.g., KATIIRYN HUNTER, DOCTORS' STORIES: THE NARRATIVE STRUCI1JRE OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1991). 
38. For a helpful recent discussion of that tradition in the bioethical context, see John D. Arras, 
Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics, 16 J. MED. PHIL. 29 (1991). 
39. Schuck, supra note 13, at 939. 
40. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
41. Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in 
Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 444 (footnote omitted). 
42. For an extended description of the distance between bioethics and the social sciences, see Renee 
C. Fox, The Evolution of American Bioethics: A Sociological Perspective, in SOCIAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS 201 (George Weisz ed., 1990). 
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social reality of bioethical problems from the empirical evidence that is 
currently available. 43 Empirical work relating to bioethics has all too 
frequently been poorly planned and performed. It has often been designed to 
test quite narrow questions, and those questions have not always been the 
ones most urgent to bioethicists. That work has not developed according to 
any larger plan, but has been done in response to a smorgasbord of discrete 
problems in a hodgepodge of fields extending from law to sociology and 
psychology to clinical medicine. Further, given the variety of medical 
decisions that are made, the variety of contexts in which they occur, and the 
variety of people who make them, it is all too likely that a study of one 
situation will be a poor guide to others. Empirical work of this kind is also 
time-bound, a particularly acute problem in an era and in areas as marked by 
fulminant change as today's medicine, bioethics, law, and society. ·Finally, 
because life is complicated and research is confoundingly difficult, even 
relevant and ably done studies can produce results that bafflingly conflict with 
the conclusions of other competently done research.44 
But I do not want to concede too much. Good empirical research into 
bioethical issues is being done.45 And it is better to have some information 
than none: Ultimately, we are wiser to use the best empirical evidence we can 
muster than idly to rely on unexamined assumptions about an uncertain 
reality. In any event, in this Article I am proposing that we should use these 
empirical data not so much as infallible guides to what happens, but to 
introduce more of the world's complexity into our thinking, both for present 
consideration and future research. 
II. HYPER-RATIONALISM AND AUTONOMISM IN BIOETHICS AND LAW 
Truth is never pure and seldom simple. 
Oscar Wilde 
The Importance of Being Earnest 
43. Indeed, it is always difficult to find adequately reliable empirical evidence and to draw useful 
conclusions from it, as a massive literature attests. For a brief but knowledgeable introduction to that 
literature, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 
SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1979). 
44. For an example of such a result, see Debra L. Roter & Judith A. Hall, Studies of Doctor-Patient 
lnteractjon, 10 ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 163 (1989). See Meisel & Roth, supra note 4, at 265, for a 
relentless demonstration of the problems with empirical research in many kinds ofbioethical problems. 
45. Recent monographic examples include, but are not limited to, RENEE ANSPACH, DECIDING \VHO 
LIVES: FATEFUL CHOICES IN THE INTENSIVE CARE NURSERY 36 (1993); ~~ARLES L. BOSK, ALL Goo's· 
MISTAKES: GENETIC COUNSELING IN A PEDIATRIC HOSPITAL (1992); ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE 
CARE: MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (1992). Janis concludes that "a substantial 
number of studies can now be drawn upon to provide promising leads for explaining health-related 
behavior and for developing practical applications ..•• " Janis, supra note 14, at 343. Anspach and 
Zussman provide illuminating apologias for the usefulness of social science in bioethics; Bosk presents 
somewhat more guarded reflections on the same topic. Robert A. Pearlman et al., Contributions of 
Empirical Research to Medical Ethics, 14 THEORETICAL MED. 197 (1993), shows how specific empirical 
studies have promoted discussion of some specific ethical issues. More broadly, see also Fox, supra note 
42, at 206. 
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give their clients an opportunity to make advance directives. 59 In a long 
series of cases posing the question when medical treatment may be withdrawn, 
state courts have generally striven to effectuate the supposed desires of the 
patient. Even Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,60 which 
has been assailed as curtailing rights of autonomy, can be understood as quite 
compatible with them. In that case, for instance, the Supreme Court 
unanimously endorsed the proposition that patients have some kind of 
constitutional status in making medical decisions.61 And the majority's 
holding was essentially based not on the absence of Cruzan's autonomy rights, 
but on the presence of reasonable doubts about how she might have wished 
to exercise them. 62 
In the particular area of bioethics to which this Article is directed-that is, 
medical decision-making-patient autonomy is strongly the dominant 
paradigm. 63 In "contemporary medical ethics, ... engaging the patient as an 
active participant in medical decision making is seen as particularly 
important,"64 and "[i]n recent decades there has been a call for greater 
patient autonomy or, as some have called it, 'patient sovereignty,' conceived 
as patient choice and control over medical decisions."65 Unfortunately, most 
bioethicists have been thoroughly (if understandably) vague about the precise 
nature and scope of that autonomy, about how it should be used, and about 
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395(cc)(t), 1396(a)(w). In addition, of course, many public and private health-
care providers have written rules (governing DNR orders, for example) and established programs (ethics 
committees, for instance), intended at least partly to protect patients' autonomy. 
60. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). For some sound views of the constitutional issues in the case, 
see Yale Kamisar, Right to Die? When Is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REv. 
1203 (1991); John Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for 
Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REv. 1139 (1991). I analyze the case in Carl E. Schneider, Cruzan and 
the Constitutionalization of American Life, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 589 (1992). 
61. As the Court put it, "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment •..• " Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. 
62. I do not mean to suggest that the law has failed to recognize some of the important reasons 
patient autonomy must be limited. For a helpful and refreshing argument that "autonomy does not seem 
to be as dominant a value as rhetoric would suggest," see Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics 
in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L.J. 727, 728 (1993). 
63. I am referring here, of course, to what bioethicists and lawyers say, not to what doctors do. 
What doctors have historically done differs markedly from what bioethicists would now have them do. 
But there is some evidence of notable changes in what doctors do. Zussman, for instance, reports that 
"the notion of rights in medicine ... has .•• become part of the culture of medicine itself." ZUSSMAN, 
supra note 45, at 85. He concludes that the "notion of rights as a broad cultural concept (the acceptance 
of which is among the indirect effects of the legal doctrine) has had far-reaching consequences, 
including, most important, an empowerment of the patient •••. " Id. at 81. Caplan notes that "[d]octors 
and nurses report in survey after survey that they support the concept of advance directives •..• " Can 
Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 261. For a less sanguine evaluation of changes in attitudes 
toward patient autonomy in decisions to terminate treatment, see David Orentlicher, The Illusion of 
Patient Choice in End-of-Lifo Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992). He believes that a "reasonable 
argument can be made that professional resistance to patient autonomy has so far prevailed and that 
changes in the treatment of the dying reflect changes in physician attitudes more than changes in the 
way end-of-life decisions are made." Id. at 2103. 
64. Lachlan Farrow eta!., Science, Ethics, and the Making of Clinical Decisions, 259 JAMA 3161, 
3166 (1988). 
65. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 19, at 2223 (emphases in original) (citation omitted). 
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how doctors and patients are to put the principle into practice. 66 However, 
the standard view broadly makes the physician the proposer and the patient 
the disposer. Brock provides a particularly lucid, measured, and moderate 
statement of that view: 
Most simply put, the physician's role is to use his or her training, 
knowledge, and experience to provide the patient with facts about the 
diagnosis and about the prognoses without treatment and with alternative 
treatments. The patient's role in this division of labor is to provide the 
values-his or her own conception of the good-with which to evaluate 
these alternatives, and to select the one that is best for himself or 
herself.67 
Further, bioethicists generally unite in wal).ting the patient's choice to be 
autonomous in quite a strong sense of that term. Thus, for example, 
Beauchamp and Childress look for a decision in which "a patient or subject 
with substantial understanding and in substantial absence of control by others 
intentionally authorizes a professional to do something."68 
This standard view of the centrality of patient autonomy and its predomi-
nance in medical decisions is enacted into law in the doctrine of informed 
consent. 69 That doctrine assumes that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not 
the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests 
seem to lie."70 Medical decisions may only be made with the patient's 
consent. Once again, consent is intended in a strong sense: "True consent to 
what happens to one's self is the i~formed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the 
risks attendant upon each."71 It is the goal of the doctrine of informed 
consent to secure "the patient's right of self-determination on [a] particular 
therapy"72 and to "enable the patient to chart his course understandably" by 
66. Instead of precision, readers ofbioethical writing must often settle for such uninformative terms 
as "shared," or "collaborative," or "participatory." The Ernanuels have made a step in the right direction 
by trying to construct ideal types of medical decisions. Id. at 2221. They identify a "paternalistic" model 
in which the doctor decides what is best, subject to the patient's assent; an "informative" model in 
which the doctor presents information to the patient and the patient makes the decision; an "interpretive" 
model in which the doctor's job is to help patients discover what they want and how best to get it; and 
a "deliberative" model in which doctors work with patients to "help the patient determine and chO!JSe 
the best health-related values that can be realized in the clinical situation." Id. at 2221-22. While the 
Ernanuels do little to identify proponents of these models, they do conclude' that there has been a "shift 
toward the informative model." Id. at 2223. 
67. Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients, 1 
KENNEDY INST. Enucs J. 28, 28 (1991). Brock's own views on the subject are engaging and well worth 
reading. For similar descriptions of how medical decisions ought to be made, see, e.g., Richard Sherlock, 
Reasonable Men and Sick Human Beings, 80 AM. J. MED. 2, 2 (1986). One of the standard internal 
medicine textbooks speaks of"a more equal relationship of shared decision making in which physicians 
provide information and counseling that allows competent adult patients to make their own choices." 
Mark Siegler & Peter A. Singer, Clinical Ethics, in 1 TExTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 3, 4 {William 
N. Kelley ed., 2d ed. 1992). 
68. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 4, at 76 (emphases in original). 
69. For an imposing list of articles to this effect, see Matjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent 
to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 226 n.30 (1985). 
70. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted). 
71. Id. at 780 (citation omitted). 
72. !d. at 784 (citation omitted). 
1994] BIOETHICS WITH A HUMAN FACE 1089 
assuring him some "familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their 
hazards."73 
The reaction of commentators to the law of informed consent confirms the 
elevated status of the autonomy paradigm and the high hopes autonomists 
have for patient participation in medical decisions. The conventional wisdom 
is that that law is wretchedly inadequate to its vocation of promoting patients' 
autonomy. Katz, for instance, calls that law "largely a charade"74 that is 
"substantially mythic and fairy tale-like as far as advancing patients' rights 
to self-decisionmaking is concerned" and that "only has made a bow toward 
a commitment to patients' self-determination."75 Appelbaum, Lidz, and 
Meisel call informed consent "a doctrine and a set of practices that compro-
mise all values and satisfy none in their entirety."76 Shultz is one of many 
who wish to broaden its scope largely. (She would require doctors to tell 
patients not just about proposed treatments, but also about possible medical 
inquiries the physician decides not to pursue.)77 More generally, commenta-
tors widely believe that "[t]he rise of patients' rights, both in law and ethics, 
instigated a revolution not yet completed,"78 a "revolution in medical 
relationships [which] remains incomplete and embattled,"79 a revolution in 
which "[t]he struggle is to recognize patients' rights."80 
In sum, the overwhelming weight of bioethical opinion thus endorses not 
just the autonomy principle, but quite a potent version of it. The autonomy 
paradigm continues to flourish, planted as it is in the fertile soil of American 
rights thinking, anchored as it is by roots that run deep into the structure of 
American law, and tended as it is by legions of votaries.81 That paradigm 
73. !d. at 781 (citation omitted). 
74. KATZ, supra note 7, at 99. 
75. Katz, supra note 32, at 174. Echoing Katz, Brennan writes that "doctors have consistently 
sought to maximize their own paternalistic prerogatives. The notion of informed consent thus remains 
a fairy tale." Troyen A. Brennan, Silent Decisions: Limits of Consent and the Terminally Ill Patient, 16 
L. MED. & HEALTII CARE 204, 204 (1988) (citation omitted). 
76. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 130. 
77. Shultz, supra note 69. For other criticisms of the doctrine of informed consent by legal 
commentators, see, e.g., HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER 83-119 (1992); Howard Brody, 
Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care, HAsTINGS CENTER. REP., Sepl-Ocl 1989, at 5; Jones, 
supra note 4; Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and 
the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTII CARE 210 (1988). 
78. Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring, 
50 Mo. L. REv. 798, 824 (1991). 
79. !d. at 857. 
80. !d. at 855. 
81. For a critical examination of the centrality of rights thinking in American politics, law, and life, 
see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmCAL DISCOURSE (1991). For 
an argument stressing that centrality, but arguing that inchoate alternatives yearn to break through, see 
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF TilE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN 
LIFE (1985). For a study of rights thinking at the intersection ofbioethics and law, see Schneider, supra 
note 60; and Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 16 CAL. L. REv. 151 (1988) 
(hereinafter Rights Discourse]. For an examination of the role of rights in medical decisions, see 
ZUSSMAN, supra note 45, at 81-97. Zussman believes that the "notion of rights" has "since about 1970, 
become part of the culture of medicine itself." !d. at 85. 
This emphasis on the distinctively American quality of the autonomy paradigm is not accidental. 
There are few if any other countries in the world in which autonomy has assumed so powerful a position 
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rests on the methodologically and substantively hyper-rationalistic assumption 
that autonomy is what people primarily and pervasively want and need. 
Correspondingly, the law of bioethics seems to assume that its principal task 
is to remove impediments to the exercise of autonomy, that once those 
impediments are removed, people will naturally gather evidence about the 
risks and benefits of each medical choice, will apply that evidence to their 
values, and will reach a considered and autonomous decision. 
Nevertheless, we may now have reached a relatively late period in what 
Kuhn might call the "normal science" of the autonomy paradigm. A large part 
of bioethical thought in recent years has involved working out what 
"autonomy" might mean. That work has produced the expected unexpected: 
"Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when 
successful, finds none. New and unsuspected phenomena are, however, 
repeatedly uncovered by scientific research .... "82 This has now occurred 
often enough in bioethics that a sense of dissatisfaction with the autonomy 
paradigm is being expressed with increasing conviction and feeling.83 We 
may thus be reaching the stage when "[t]he proliferation of competing 
articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit 
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals [mark] 
a transition from normal to extraordinary research. "84 
In this paper, then, I want to begin to identify a few of the anomalies and 
discontents that have arisen out of the work of normal science under the 
autonomy paradigm. I will do so by examining one cl}allenging kind of 
empirical evidence about how people actually think about their role in making 
medical decisions. To that evidence we now turn. 
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of 
instructing the present for the benefit of future ages. To such 
high offices this work does not aspire: It wants only to show 
what actually happened. 
Leopold von Ranke 
Histories of the Latin and Teutonic Nations (1494-1514) 
Given bioethics' autonomy paradigm and its hyper-rational pre-
mises-particularly its presumptions that people behave in generally similar 
in thinking about the authority of the patient. And there are many countries-even highly industrialized 
countries-where a very different paradigm presides. 
82. KUHN, supra note 46, at 52. 
83. Among the criticisms particularly noticed have been, for example, Daniel Callahan, Autonomy: 
A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 40; Daniel Callahan, 
Contemporary Biomedical Ethics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1228 (1980); Willard Gaylin, Autonomy, 
Paternalism, and Community, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 5; Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy's 
Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 38. I have expressed my own discomforts 
at misuses of the principle of autonomy in the law ofbioethics in Rights Discourse, supra note 81. 
84. KUHN, supra note 46, at 91. 
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ways, that they seek to maximize their autonomy, and that they make 
decisions by assembling all the relevant data and selecting the course that 
optimizes the goals they have already developed-it is not surprising that 
bioethicists and lawyers widely assume that patients want to seize and make 
their own medical decisions. 85 In light of these assumptions, perhaps some 
of the most arresting empirical data so far accumulated are those which 
suggest that a significant number of patients are reluctant to make such 
decisions. Because this literature is complex and, to hyper-rationalists, 
counter-intuitive, I will discuss several studies in some detail. 
We begin with Ende and his colleagues. They presented 312 patients in a 
primary-care clinic of a teaching hospital with vignettes representing various 
levels of illness severity. 86 "On a scale where 0 indicates a very low and 100 
indicates a very high preference for decision making, and 50 indicates a 
neutral attitude, the mean score for the study population was 33.2 ± 12.6."87 
Thus, the authors concluded that "patients' preferences for decision making 
in general were weak. Moreover, as patients were asked to consider 
increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make decisions themselves 
declined."88 Like a number of other studies, this one found that younger 
people were most likely to want to participate in decisions. More clearly than 
other studies, this one concluded that higher education, higher occupational 
status, and being divorced or separated were also associated with such a 
desire. However, these factors accounted for only 19% of the variation among 
patients. 
This study did very much resemble other studies in one consequential 
respect: That patients were not avid to participate in decisions did not mean 
that they did not want to be informed about what was going on. Quite the 
contrary. Like patients in study after study, these patients widely said they 
were anxious to be told about their medical situation. In fact, "the mean score 
for information seeking was 79.5 ± 11.5."89 
Another striking study was conducted by Strull and his associates. They 
studied 210 hypertension patients and their physicians in a community hospital 
85. Katz, for example, writes, "I said more, althougli still not enough, about the prevalent assertion 
that patients generally do not wish to share the burdens of decision and that they prefer instead to trust 
their doctors' recommendations blindly. I doubt this assertion." KATZ, supra note 7, at 228. (Of course, 
in the tendentious way Katz phrases this "prevalent assertion," it is indeed dubious. I too doubt that 
patients want to trust their doctors "blindly.') The President's Commission comfortably concluded that 
"the vast majority of people surveyed by the Commission felt that patients ... ought to participate in 
decisions regarding their health care." I President's Comm., supra note 58, at 17. For a more exact 
description of these survey data, see infra text accompanying notes 117-19. 
86. Jack Ende et al., Measuring Patients' Desire for Autonomy: Decision Making and Information-
Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 23, 23 (1989). "Upper 
respiratory tract illness (URI) represented mild disease; hypertension (HBP), moderate disease; and 
myocardial infarction (MI), severe or most threatening disease." Id. 
87. Id. at 25. These results were confirmed in a study of the membership of an HMO. Suzanne C. 
Thompson et a!., Preferences for Involvement in Medical Decision Making: Situational and 
Demographic Influences, 22 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING, 133 (1993). 
88. Ende et al., supra note 86, at 26-27. 
89. Id. at 26. 
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clinic, an HMO, and a VA outpatient clinic.90 Like the Ende group, they 
found that patients wanted information. "Fifty-two percent of patients reported 
that they had received 'quite a lot' of information or 'all there is to know' 
about hypertension and its therapy from their current clinician."91 In 
evaluating the information they had received, "[f]orty-one. percent of the 
patients stated they would have preferred additional information, while 58% 
received the 'right amount,' and only one patient preferred less informa-
tion."92 
But much as the patients wanted to be informed they did not equivalently 
want to participate in medical decisions: 
[N]early half (47%) of patients preferred that the clinician make the 
therapeutic decisions "using all that is known about the medicines" but • 
without the patient's participation .... One third of the patients preferred 
that the clinician make the decision "but strongly consider the patient's 
opinion." Only 19% of the patients stated they wish to share equally with 
the clinician in making the decision, and 3% wished to make the decision 
themselves."93 
Intriguingly, the doctors over-estimated their patients' desire to make medical 
decisions: "In contrast to the patient preferences, in the large majority of 
cases (78%) clinicians believed that patients wanted to help make decisions. 
In only 22% of cases did the clinician think the patient wanted the clinician 
alone to decide. "94 
The patients and physicians disagreed about how decisions were in fact 
made. 
Sixty-three percent of patients reported that the "clinician usually makes 
the decision, using all that's known about the medicines," while clinicians 
reported such decision making in only 20% of cases .... Only 37% of 
patients, as opposed to 80% of clinicians, reported that the patient 
participates to any extent in decisions.95 
But whatever was happening was not making the patients unhappy. Eighty-
nine percent ofthem "reported being 'very' or 'extremely' satisfied with their 
overall medical care from their current clinician, and 84% reported a 'very' 
or 'extremely' high degree of satisfaction with the way in which decisions 
about their treatment are made."96 
Vertinsky and his collaborators also studied a population whose interest in 
being informed exceeded their interest in controlling their treatment.97 This 
90. William M. Stroll et al., Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical Decision Making?, 252 
JAMA 2990 (1984). 
91. Id. at 2991. The clinicians, however, "reported giving these amounts of information in only 38% 
of cases." Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 2992 (quoting the language used on a questionnaire to patients). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 2993. 
97. Ilan B. Vertinsky et al., Measuring Consumer Desire for Participation in Clinical Decision 
Making, 9 HEALTH SERV. REsEARCH 121 (1974). 
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team surveyed two hundred randomly chosen residents of Vancouver and 
asked them how they would react to a scenario in which a patient has a strep 
throat and in which the doctor does not tell the patient all the risks of either 
non-treatment or treatment. The factor that was least often chosen was 
"patient decision," which was "defined in terms of preference for retaining the 
final decision function in the patient's hands."98 Indeed, "[d]irect participa-
tion ('Patient Decision') ... was rated as unimportant by almost all subjects, 
although patients indicate rather strongly a desire to maintain some measure 
of participation ('Avoidance' receiving markedly low scores)."99 
Another study showing that a substantial number of patients are loath to 
make their own medical decisions was conducted by Faden and her co-
workers. 100 They asked 53 seizure patients to choose between, on one hand, 
having their doctor decide whether they needed medication and, if so, which 
medication or, on the other hand, hearing the doctor's recommendation but 
deciding whether to receive medication and which to take. The former course 
was chosen by 44.2%, the latter by 55.8%. 101 Thus while a majority of the 
patients questioned preferred to make their own medical decision, a very large 
minority rejected that approach. This result is particularly remarkable because 
the patients studied (who were from Walter Reed Hospital) "could be 
described as young, adult, married, white and fairly well educated,"102 a 
selection of people probably likeliest to want to make their own medical 
decisions. 
Beisecker studied 106 people "with a wide range of ailments and disabili-
ties: recovering stroke patients, head trauma and other accident victims, 
patients with sports injuries, amputees, and patients with severe arthritis, 
chronic back pain, and muscle diseases such as muscular dystrophy" who 
were patients of specialists in physical medicine and rehabilitation. 103 
Beisecker used a scale for measuring preferences about medical decisions on 
which "belief in the patient as sole locus of decision-making authority would 
yield a scale score of 26; belief in the doctor as the sole decision-maker 
would yield a score of 0, and belief that all decisions should be made jointly 
(or indicating that a doctor's decisions counterbalanced those which should 
98. I d. at 128. This factor was comprised of statements like: "Ask the doctor to give him all the 
information he has, and then the patient decides what to do." Id. 
99. Id. at 133. Avoidance was "defined in terms of items indicating propensity to delegate the 
decision function completely (0 'Just follow the doctor's orders and go home')." Id. at 128. 
100. Ruth R. Faden et al., Disclosure of Information to Patients in Medical Care, 19 MED. CARE 718 
(1981). • 
101. What makes the study particularly interesting was that 93% of the neurologists interviewed 
believed the doctor should make the choices. However here, as in a number of other efforts, the 
usefulness of the study's results are impeded by the fact that its respondents were forced to choose 
between only two options. Once again, too, the study reported extremely widespread interest in 
information about available medications and their risks. Interestingly, though, the information the fewest 
people wanted was the information about "drug-related mortality." 
102. Faden et al., supra note 100, at 720. 
103. Analee E. Beisecker, Aging and the Desire for Information and Input in Medical Decisions: 
Patient Consumerism in Medical Encounters, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 330, 332 (1988). 
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be made by the patient) would yield a score of 13."104 The mean score for 
Beisecker's medically diverse population was 8.6. 
Mark and Spiro studied 102 outpatients scheduled to undergo a colono-
scopy. "When asked, 'Which way would you prefer to come to a medical 
decision?' 57 patients wanted to share the decision with the physician, 22 
wanted to make their own decision, and 23 wanted the physician to make the 
decision."105 Asked about the decision to have a colonoscopy examination, 
"53 patients said that they shared the decision with the physician, 40 patients 
said that the physician was most responsible for the decision, and 9 patients 
said that they were most responsible." Yet despite the apparent discrepancy 
between how some patients said they wanted medical decisions to be made 
and the way the colonoscopy decision was made, "only two patients declined 
to say in the end that they had 'just the right amount of responsibility in 
making the decision .... " 106 
A study by Lidz and his collaborators of informed consent produced clearer 
results. 107 They concluded that, "with a few exceptions ... , the patients 
believed that decisions about their treatment should be primarily or completely 
up to their physicians because of their technical expertise and commitment to 
the best interests of the patients."108 Again, patients did want information. 
But "[ o ]nly about 10% of the patients we interviewed saw themselves as 
having an active role in decision making."109 
Also notable, if rather vaguely reported, is a study by Miller, et al., of 150 
primary-care patients at a department of internal medicine. This study was 
undertaken to evaluate the way different personality types respond to threats 
to their health. It found that "almost no patients desired to have the final say 
in their medical care" and that 36.5% of one personality type and 15.9% of 
the other "desired to play a completely passive role in their own care."110 
An illuminating perspective on the desire of patients to make medical 
decisions comes from a study by Degner and Sloan, whose study compares the 
attitudes of newly diagnosed cancer patients and a random sample of residents 
of Winnipeg. 111 
104. /d. 
105. Jennifer Susan Mark & Howard Spiro, Informed Consent for Colonoscopy, 150 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MEDICINE 777, 777-78 (1990). 
106. /d. at 778. 
107. Charles W. Lidz et al., Barriers to Informed Consent, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 539 (1983). 
One more impressionistic study of informed consent reported that the researcher's "period of observation 
bore out that in many eases patients do request or allow physicians to make decisions for them." Jones, 
supra note 4, at 419-20 (citation omitted). 
108. Lidz et al., supra note 107, at 540. 
109. /d. at 541. 
llO. Suzanne M. Miller et al., Styles of Coping with Threat: Implications for Health, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 142, 146 (1988). They found that 48.1% of the former personality type 
("high monitors'') and 71.4% of the latter ("low monitors'') "preferred that treatment decisions be made 
jointly by themselves and their physicians." /d. 
Ill. Lesley F. Degner & Jeffrey A. Sloan, Decision Making During Serious Illness: What Role Do 
Patients Really Want to Play?, 45 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 941 (1992). 
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The majority of newly diagnosed patients (59%) preferred that physicians 
make treatment decisions on their behalf. The most popular first choice of 
patients was the statement, "I prefer that my doctor makes the final 
decision about which treatment will be used, but seriously considers my 
opinion." Only 12% of newly diagnosed patients preferred to play an active 
role in decision making.112 
1095 
The residents of Winnipeg, in contrast, seemed more interested in such 
participation. Sixty-four percent of them thought they would want to play an 
active role in decision making if they were to develop cancer. 113 
Another Canadian study questioned 52 cancer patients in early stages of 
their disease. 114 Sixty-three percent of them "felt the physician should take 
the primary responsibility in decision making, 27% felt it should be an equally 
shared process, and 10% felt they should take a major role."IIS Again, even 
patients who expected their doctors to assume the primary responsibility for 
medical decisions were interested in receiving information. 
Another relevant study was conducted by Cassileth and company.116 They 
gave 256 cancer patients a choice between two statements: "I prefer to 
participate in decisions about my medical care and treatment," and "I prefer 
to leave decisions about my medical care and treatment up to my doctor." 
Eighty-seven percent of those aged 20- 39, 62% of those aged 40- 59, and 
51% of those over 60 chose the former statement. 117 This is one of the most 
frequently recruited citations for the proposition that patients want to make 
medical decisions. Yet even it concludes that a substantial number of patients 
are willing to subscribe to quite a strongly stated desire to cede authority to 
their doctors. In addition, the reaction to this study typifies a common but 
unfortunate response to empirical studies-to transform a finding that a 
majority prefer something into the assertion that everyone wants it. As has 
been well said, "In health index construction, in the evaluation of the 
outcomes of clinical trials and in clinical decision analysis for groups of 
patients the use of average preference scores runs the danger of 'the tyranny 
of the majority': it essentially disregards the opinions of those whose scores 
are removed from the mean."118 
112. Id. at 945-46. 
113. !d. at 946. Once again, age was the best (though not a particularly strong) predictor of a 
preference for participation in making decisions. Interestingly, "[t)he clinical hypothesis that patients 
who are more ill prefer less control in cancer treatment decision making was not supported. Neither 
symptom distress levels nor stage of disease were related to patients' role preferences." !d. at 947. 
114. H.J. Sutherland et a!., Cancer Patients: Their Desire for Information and Participation in 
Treatment Decisions, 82 J. ROYAL Soc'Y MED. 260 (1989). 
115. Id. at 262. 
116. BarrieR. Cassileth eta!., Information and Participation Preferences Among Cancer Patients, 
92 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 832 (1980). 
117. !d. at 834. Once again, the desire for information outweighed the desire for control: The parallel 
assents to the statement "I want as much information as possible, good and bad" were 96%, 79%, and 
80%. Id. at 833-34 (emphasis in original). 
118. Health Services Research Group, Studying Patients' Preferences in Health Care Decision 
Making, 147 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 859, 862 (1992). 
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Furthermore, even those who chose the first of the two statements in the 
Cassileth study were only asking for some-unspecified-level of participa-
tion in decisions. Some, and perhaps many, of those patients may have wanted 
little more than to receive good information and to retain a veto power over 
their doctor's decisions (although presumably others of them actually wanted 
to make some decisions in some stronger sense). In addition, it seems likely 
that the relatively great desire for participation this study reports is an artifact 
of the maximally narrow range of choices the respondents were given.119 
Finally, there is the Louis Harris poll of doctors and the general public 
~undertaken for the President's Commission.120 Seven percent of the public 
wanted the doctor to present all the possible alternatives and to let the patient 
decide. Twelve percent wanted the doctor to present a recommendation for the 
patient to accept or reject. Seven percent wanted the doctor to decide what 
should be done and to do it. Seventy-two percent thought the doctor should 
discuss alternatives with the patient and that they should then decide together 
what to do. Less than half a percent thought the way to proceed depends on 
the circumstances. 121 
This is probably the strongest statement of a public desire to make medical 
decisions. However, it is not easy to interpret. Most of the respondents wanted 
the doctor and patient to decide together what to do, but it is most unclear 
just ·how they envisioned the allocation of power between th~ doctor and 
patient. For instance, Ende and his colleagues conclude that the Harris data 
"seem to support the notion that patients prefer the model wherein the doctor 
keeps the patient informed and engages the patient in the decision making 
process, rather than having the patient function as the principal decision 
maker."122 It is at least significant that very few patients opted for the 
response-having the doctor pres·ent alternatives for the patient's deci-
sion-that comes closest to Brock's formulation of the autonomy standard for 
patients' decisions. 
What, then, can we say of the studies of patients' desires to participate in 
medical decisions? They certainly have their drawbacks. To begin with, they 
119. For criticisms of this feature of the Cassileth study, see Degner & Sloan, supra note Ill, at 948; 
Ende et a!., supra note 86, at 27. Other studies have used the same two-alternatives question about 
decision-making employed in the Cassileth study and have yielded relatively high desires to make 
decisions, although still with substantial numbers preferring to avoid decisions. For example, one study 
reported that 70% of their respondents wanted to participate in medical decisions. Marc D. Silverstein 
et a!., Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Life-Sustaining Therapy: Patients' Desires for Information, 
Participation in Decision Making, and Life-Sustaining Therapy, 66 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 906, 908 
(1991). Similarly, Christina G. Blanchard et a!., Information and Decision-Making Preferences of 
Hospitalized Adult Cancer Patients, 27 Soc. Sci. MED. I 139, 1143 (1988), found that "almost one-third 
(30.5%) (of the cancer patients they interviewed] stated that they preferred to leave decisions about their 
medical care and treatment up to their doctor." 
120. Louis Harris & Associates, Views of Informed Consent and Decisionmaking: Parallel Surveys 
of Physicians and the Public, in 2 President's Comm., supra note 58, at 17. 
121. Id. at 209. It is also notable that the worse the health of the respondents, the less likely they 
were to want to make their own decisions. 
122. Ende et a!., supra note 86, at 27. For a useful attempt to demonstrate that all the studies 
showing a higher desire for participation do not conflict with the conclusions of those studies showing 
a lower desire, see id. at 27-28. 
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generally used questions which were frustratingly inexact, so that we are 
almost always left to guess precisely what allocation of authority the 
respondents had in mind. Part of the problem here is due to the fact that all 
the studies I have reviewed are quantitative surveys, not the kind of 
qualitative, ethnographic research that might better yield more richly textured 
information. Thus these studies do disappointingly little to dispel the haze of 
imprecision veiling discussions of how authority should be allocated between 
patient and doctor. 
Further, there are reasons to have some qualms about the reliability of the 
enterprise of asking people what role they want in medical decisions. People 
will quite reasonably not always know what they want. These are, after all, 
hard questions and questions about which many people will not have thought 
much and about which people may change their minds with experience and 
reflection. Indeed, these are questions about which people may reasonably be 
primarily ambivalent. And even people who know what they want will often 
have difficulty articulating their preferences. All these problems are at their 
most acute when, as often occurred, studies ask people who are not sick to 
speculate about how they would feel about medical decisions if they were 
sick, or ask people who are sick about hypothetical variations on their illness. 
Along these lines, it is tantalizing that none of the studies probes very far-if 
at all-into the reasons people might have for wanting or rejecting medical 
authority. That information might have helped us understand much more 
accurately what patients truly want. 
In addition, these studies do not adequately take into account the daunting 
range of circumstances in which medical decisions are made. It will surely 
matter how sick or healthy the patient is, how well the doctor and patient 
know each other, how trivial or consequential the decision is, how technical 
the issues raised, and so on. It will particularly matter where the decision falls 
on the (somewhat artificial) continuum between purely medical decisions on 
one hand and purely social or moral decisions on the other. 
Nevertheless, these studies are the best evidence we have about peoples' 
attitudes toward medical decisions. And I believe they are adequate to provide 
a basis for thinking about those attitudes. Taken as a whole, these studies 
surveyed a considerable variety of populations-from the perfectly well to the 
dangerously sick. They asked patients about their own conditions and about 
hypothetical illnesses. They framed their respondents' choices in a variety of 
ways. And their virtually universal conclusion was that, while patients 
commonly wish to be informed about their medical circumstances, at least a 
quite substantial number of them did not want to make their own medical 
decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those decisions in any very 
significant way. 
Another reason for taking these studies seriously is that their conclusions 
about people's reluctance to seize control of their medical decisions find some 
substantiation in several different kinds of evidence. Consider, first, the 
reaction to the burgeoning availability of advance directives. In recent years, 
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cases like Quinlan123 and Cruzan, 124 publicists like Jack Kevorkian, and 
referenda like those in Washington and California have brought questions 
about terminating life support to the fore of public discussion. Part of this 
discussion has consisted of adjurations to sign advance directives. That people 
should do so has become the conventional wisdom. Patients have forms thrust 
upon them when they enter health-care facilities. Many lawyers routinely offer 
to prepare advance directives when people come in for estate planning. 
Despite all this, relatively few people have prepared advance directives, and 
many people appear reluctant to discuss such matters even with their families 
(to say nothing of their doctors). 125 There are, to be sure, a number of 
reasons for this, not least that people are fearful and superstitious, that they 
"prefer to avoid the subject of how to manage their own dying."126 But the 
point is exactly that many people have strong reasons for not wanting to grasp 
the nettle of autonomy. 
Much more arresting is the evidence that people do not necessarily 
contemplate that advance directives should necessarily be scrupulously 
followed. In a study conducted by Sehgal and her colleagues, 150 dialysis 
patients were asked "[ w ]hom they would want to help their physician make 
decisions for them if they developed advanced Alzheimer's disease" and 
"[h]ow much leeway their physician and surrogate should have to override 
this advance directive if overriding were in their best interests."127 These 
patients "varied greatly in how much leeway they would give their physician 
and surrogate to override their advance directive if overriding were in their 
best interests: 'no leeway' (39%), 'a little leeway' (19%), 'a lot of leeway' 
(11 %), and 'complete leeway' (31 %)."128 In brief, if people were as avid to 
123. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
124. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
125. For instance, Caplan concludes that no more than 10% of the population has an advance 
directive. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 261. It appears that even those presumptively 
most in need of advance directives prepare them with surprising infrequency. Thus one study found that, 
while half of the 39 nursing home patients questioned had thought about end-of-life decisions, only 6 
had actually signed advance directives. Eric L. Diamond et a!., Decision-Making Ability and Advance 
Directive Preferences in Nursing Home Patients and Their Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 622 (1989). 
One random survey of outpatients found that only 11% had discussed cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
with their doctors, while 67% had thought of doing so. (Forty-four percent had discussed the issue with 
someone else.) Mark H. Ebell et a!., The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order: Outpatient Experience and 
Decision-Making, 31 J. FAM. PRAC. 630 (1990). Another study found that only 9% of its re·spondents 
had discussed surrogate decision-makers with their doctors and that only 6% had discussed life-
sustaining treatment. Bernard Lo eta!., Patient Attitudes to Discussing Life-Sustaining Treatment, 146 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1613 (1986). For a review of studies suggesting that people rarely discuss 
termination of treatment with either their families or their doctors, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. 
Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients, 267 JAMA 2067, 2068-69 (1992). 
126. Can Autonomy Be Saved?, supra note 26, at 263. Caplan observes that there has been a similar 
reluctance to sign organ-donor cards. 
127. Ashwini Sehgal et a!., How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their Advance Directives 
Followed?, 267 JAMA 59, 60 (1992). 
128. /d. at 61. "Sixty percent of subjects with prior written directives wanted advance directives 
followed strictly in our scenarios. By contrast, 33% of subjects without prior written directives wanted 
advance directives followed strictly .... " Id. People with histories of other serious illness (cancer or 
stroke) were particularly unlikely to want their advance directives strictly followed. /d. For reflections 
on this problem, see Dan W. Brock, Trumping Advance Directives, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 
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make their own medical decisions as is supposed, would they not more 
eagerly seize the opportunity to make advance directives, and would they not 
more consistently oppose meddling with directives they had made? 
Another behavioral datum likewise hints that patients hesitate about taking 
control of medical decisions. One might suppose that if patients were ever to 
assert their decisional authority, it would be after hearing the alarming 
recitation of risks that characterizes the process of informed consent. Yet a 
number of studies of that process "strongly suggest that refusals attributable 
to disclosures are rarely, if ever, seen."129 Similarly, a study of why patients 
refuse treatment found an average of 4.6 refusals per 100 patient days. 130 
The reasons for refusal were complex, and generally there was more than one 
"cause" per patient. But two kinds of reasons stood out: first, a failure to tell 
the patient about the purpose of what was proposed; second, psychological 
factors, prominently including "characterological factors" (for example, using 
a refusal to accept treatment as a way of expressing a wish to be cared for) 
and "other psychoses." While the first of these causes reconfirms the wish for 
information we have so frequently encountered, neither of them is inconsistent 
with a reluctance to take control of medical decisions.131 And the dog that 
did not bark in the night is the absence of any significant number of patients 
who heard a doctor's recommendation and reached a different decision on the 
merits.132 
Yet another piece of evidence about the reluctance of some patients to 
assume the reins of medical command comes from my own research. The 
doctors I have so far interviewed-and I hasten to say my interviews are far 
from complete and can hardly claim to be either fully representative or 
systematic-agree emphatically that a significant number of patients do not 
want to make their own medical decisions. 133 To be sure, these doctors may 
1991, at 55. 
129. Faden et al., supra note 100, at 732. Similarly, "the empirical and anecdotal studies of patients 
who refuse treatment almost never portray the process of obtaining informed consent as playing a 
causative role." APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4, at 202. 
130. PaulS. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Patients Who RefUse Treatment in Medical Hospitals, 250 
JAMA 1296, 1297 (1983). The Harris Report observes that 79% of all those surveyed reported that they 
had never refused treatment a doctor recommended. The report does not reveal what kind of treatment 
the other ?1% refused or why they refused it 3 President's Comm., supra note 58, at 184 app. B. 
131. As Sherlock puts the point, "[e]ven when patients refuse recommended treatment, they do so 
usually not for elaborate reasons of religious or moral principle but most often because they have lost 
the trust essential for care, i.e., they do not believe the physician or the staff cares for them and they 
can no longer entrust their care to these persons." Richard Sherlock, Reasonable Men and Sick Human 
Beings, 80 AM. J. MED. 2, 3 (1986). Perhaps the widespread phenomenon of patient "non-compliance" 
represents a kind of passive resistance to the doctor's making of medical decisions. I suspect, however, 
that it at least represents a good deal more as well. 
132. Of course, there are good reasons not to expect massive patient refusals after being given 
"informed consent" Informed consent often comes rather late in the decision-making process, doctors 
often do not take it as seriously as courts wish, doctors can frame information to make the recommended 
choice relatively attractive, and so on. But the virtual absence of patient refusals at that point is too 
complete a phenomenon to be accounted for just in terms of the defects of informed consent 
133. Katz (disapprovingly) quotes Richard Selzer in a somewhat hyperbolic version of such 
physicians' reports: "When I try to call the patient in on a consultation and say, 'Which alternative 
would you prefer?' invariably the patient says, 'What do you mean, which alternative? I want you to 
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have their own reasons for believing and saying that patients want to cede 
them authority, and they are guided by their own cultural preconceptions when 
they interpret what patients do and say. But I am as reluctant to dismiss their 
evidence entirely on those grounds as I am to dismiss the assertions of 
bioethicists and lawyers because of their own considerable stakes-economic, 
social, and intellectual-in the issues they debate. And, to be sure, doctors 
have notorious difficulty assessing their patients' desire to make medical 
decisions. 134 But doctors have a unique and rich perspective and experience 
too valuable to be lost and too direct to be dismissed out of hand. Thus, I 
believe that the testimony of these doctors is at least relevant as confirmation 
of what the other sources I have reviewed indicate. 
A final confirmation of my thesis-anecdotal but illuminating-comes from 
the memoirs of the sick and of the families who have cared for them. Some 
of these memoirists complain of being deprived of decisional authority. 135 
But a number-! would say a preponderance-of these extensive and intensive 
accounts of sickness conspicuously fail to make that complaint. 136 The self-
conscious and articulate folk who write these memoirs are exactly the people 
one would think likeliest to want such authority and to notice and criticize its 
absence. They are certainly willing to express their unhappiness, even their 
bitterness, with other medical deficiencies. But their grievances have most 
conspicuously to do not with being deprived of authority, but with medical 
errors, with doctors' lack of sympathy and understanding, with lack of 
information, with the insolence and inefficiencies of medical bureaucracy, and 
with doctors who were not there to attend to the case. (And, it should be said, 
these same memoirists often volunteer appreciation and even enthusiasm for 
doctors who were conscientious, kind, and competent.) 
This anecdotal evidence finds some (rather tangential) substantiation in two 
kinds of empirical data. The first kind lies in studies of what causes 
dissatisfied patients to sue their physicians. One such study found that "while 
the current trend in medicine stresses the importance of treating patients as 
tell me what to do. You're the doctor.'" KATZ, supra note 7, at 126 (quoting F. Middleton, Profile: 
Richard Selzer, NEW HAVEN MAG., July 1983, at 37). 
134. See, e.g., Strull et al., supra note 90, at 2992. 
135. See, e.g., MARTHA WEINMAN LEAR, HEARTSOUNDS {1980); ANDREW H. MALCOLM, SOMEDAY: 
THE STORY OF A MOTHER AND HER SON {1991); CORNELIUS RYAN & KATHRYN MORGAN RYAN, A 
PRIVATE BATTLE (1979). Cornelius Ryan, the author of several books on World War II battles, resolved 
to. research his disease in the same way that he researched those battles. Malcolm's book is an argument 
in favor of allowing patients more control of the decision to end treatment necessary to keep them alive. 
Lear's husband died of heart disease. With Ryan he is the patient in these memoirs most anxious to 
control his own treatment. Notably, he was also a physician. Lear herself, however, exclaims at one 
point of a conversation with one of her husband's doctors, "Damn, don't give me options. Give me 
guidance." LEAR, supra at 291. 
136. E.g., ANATOLE BROYARD, INTOXICATED BY MY ILLNESS, AND OTHER WRITINGS ON LIFE AND 
DEATH (1992); ARTHUR W. FRANK, AT THE WILL OF THE BODY {1991); MOLLY HASKELL, LoVE AND 
OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASES: A MEMOIR (1990); BERNICE KAVINOKY, VOYAGE AND RETURN (1966); 
MADELEINE L 'ENGLE, TwO-PART INVENTION: THE STORY OF A MARRIAGE {1988); FITZHUGH MULLAN, 
VITAL SIGNS: A YOUNG DOCTOR'S STRUGGLE WITH CANCER {1983); ROBERT F. MURPHY, THE BODY 
SILENT (1990); PHILIP ROTH, PATRIMONY: A TRUE STORY (1991); OLIVER SACKS, A LEG TO STAND 
ON (1987); BARBARA D. WEBSTER, ALL OF A PIECE: A LIFE WITH MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (1989). 
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active participants in the delivery of medical services, such considerations 
may have few consequences for disputing. At bottom, only the doctor's 
perceived competence and attention to the patient's health appear to influence 
the decision to sue."137 The second kind of support for the conclusion I have 
drawn from patients' and families' memoirs comes from studies of patient 
satisfaction. These studies commonly conclude that patients are generally 
satisfied with the care they receive from their own physicians (even if they 
are not so content with doctors en masse) and with their degree of participa-
tion in medical decisions.138 
In sum, not only does the survey literature strongly suggest that a 
significant number of people do not yearn to make their own medical 
decisions, but that literature is substantiated-sometimes obliquely, sometimes 
directly-by a variety of other kinds of evidence. But one other point about 
this body of evidence needs to be recognized. There is reason to think that the 
graver the decision, the less likely the patient may be (other things being 
equal) to want to address it. There is, in other words, evidence that the more 
severe the patient's illness, the less likely the patient is to want to make 
medical decisions. 139 This is plausible enough, since the sicker a patient is, 
the less energy and capacity the patient is likely to feel. If this is true, it is 
important, since it means that the most consequential decisions will often be 
exactly those the patient is the least inclined to make. 
Similarly, as we have seen, there is fairly consistent evidence that the older 
patients are, the less likely they are to want to make their own decisions. This 
is also important, and for much the same reason: those patients who are 
likeliest to have serious medical problems and to be making life-and-death 
decisions are least likely to relish making their own decisions. Thus, the 
survey data may even understate the extent to which actual patients with 
serious decisions to make want to exercise their autonomy. 
137. Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical 
Grievances, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 105, 116 (1990). Their results "tentatively suggest that patients are 
not affected by many of the procedural niceties of these efforts [to improve communication between 
doctor and patient]: involving the patient as partner, informing the patient about care, not rushing the 
patient's visit, and taking personal care about the patient's medical problem." Id. at 118. 
138. As the President's Commission noted, its survey found that "only 7% of the public reports 
dissatisfaction with their doctors' respect for their treatment preferences." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR 
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, 
MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT 
IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP, VOLUME ONE: REPORT 46 (U.S. G.P.O. 1982). To like 
effect, see, e.g., Mark & Spiro, supra note 105, at 778; William M. Stroll eta!., Do Patients Want to 
Participate in Medical Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990, 2993 (1984). -
139. Ende et al., supra note 86, at 26-27; Harris & Associates, supra note 120, at 17; Sutherland et 
al., supra note 114, at 260. Similarly, another study found that patients "who preferred leaving decisions 
to the physician had a lower performance status, i.e., in bed more than half of the day or totally bed-
ridden, than those who preferred to participate in decisions .... "Blanchard eta!., supra note 119, at 
1142. And it is highly suggestive that older people, who have generally had more experience with 
serious illness than young people, are also likelier to wish to defer their medical decisions to someone 
else. See, e.g., Cassileth et a!., supra note 116. It is also suggestive that people with histories of serious 
illness were particularly unlikely to be anxious that their advance directives be strictly followed. But cf 
Degner & Sloan, supra note 111, at 947 (finding that symptom-distress levels were not related to 
patients' preferences about decisions). 
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The evidence I have been summarizing is highly suggestive but hardly 
unequivocal. The studies I have reviewed differ markedly in their quality, in 
their range, in their goals, in their sites, in their patient populations, in their 
techniques, in their results, and in their conclusions. Taken as a whole, the 
evidence I have amassed leaves many questions unanswered. It resembles the 
few, damaged, and scattered stones in an ancient mosaic discovered by an 
archeologist. They establish convincingly enough the subject of the picture; 
but they leave its details uncertain. 
This evidence, for instance, indicates quite clearly that most patients believe 
they want "information." But it hardly tells us which kinds of information 
patients want, how much of it they want, when they want it, why they want 
it, when they might not want it, or what they might do with it. For example, 
in my own research I interviewed one patient who distinctly wanted to be kept 
informed of what was going to happen next, but did not want to be told until 
right before it was going to happen, since he did not want to dwell on 
possibly unpleasant information that he did not immediately need. Many other 
patients I have talked with seem much more anxious for information that will 
be helpful in handling day-to-day problems than in hardcore medical 
information. And so on. 
In addition, the evidence I have reviewed tells us that many, but not all, and 
perhaps not even most, patients are reluctant to assume full decisional power. 
But much remains unclear. That patients do not want full power does not 
mean that they want none. It seems likely, for instance, that even patients who 
wish to yield authority to make most decisions wish to retain residual 
authority to countermand particularly troublesome ones. It is at least apparent 
that patients do want a good deal of information, and information permits 
patients to oversee their treatment to some extent and to intervene in it if they 
so choose. 
That patients want to cede some of their authority does not tell us to whom 
they wish to cede it. It seems likely, for example, that some patients want to 
accord some of their authority not to their doctors but rather to their families. 
I have encountered a number of examples of this in my research. Quite often, 
one will see elderly but competent parents who have effectively delegated 
authority to make medical decisions to their middle-aged children. And not 
infrequently one encounters similar delegations one spouse has made to the 
other. 140 
Further, that patients do not relish making "medical" decisions does not 
mean that they are similarly reluctant to make social or moral decisions raised 
by their illness. Thus a patient might refuse to make any decision about what 
kinds of treatment to receive, but might insist on retaining the power to reject 
some treatments as socially impractical or even to reject treatment altogether. 
140. For reflections on the role of families in medical decisions, see Jeffrey Blustein, The Family in 
Medical Decisionmaking, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1993, at 6; Symposium, Ethics, Bioethics, 
and Family Law, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 735. For an extended and moving description of the way one son 
shared decisional authority with his father, see ROTH, supra note 136. 
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In sum, the empirical evidence I have recited raises many provocative issues 
and suggests many fascinating questions for future inquiry. That is part of the 
attraction of these data and of the empirical method in bioethics. But these 
studies seem to me quite strong enough to support at least one telling 
conclusion: A significant-and perhaps quite a substantial-number of people 
are not hungry to make decisions about their medical problems. 
CONCLUSION 
No themes are so human as those that reflect for us, out of 
confusion of life, the close connexion of bliss and bale, of 
things that help with the things that hurt, so dangling before for 
ever that bright hard medal, of so strange an alloy, one of 
which is somebody's right and ease and the other pain and 
wrong. 
Henry James 
What Maisie Knew 
What are we to make of the data I have reviewed? As I hope I need not say, 
those data do not show, and are not recruited to show, that autonomy is a 
valueless value, that many patients do not want to exercise it in many ways, 
or that the law should discard autonomy from its agenda of esteem. But these 
data seem to me to exemplify the ways in which empirical research can raise 
fruitful questions about the scope, strength, and nature of the autonomy 
paradigm. I believe, in other words, that we have at least reached that point 
in the Kuhnian progression at which we need to develop and refine the 
autonomy paradigm to take into account the world's complexity, to accord 
each element of the paradigm a better-gauged place, to accommodate 
competing claims and interests. The data I have surveyed raise questions 
which will help us in those tasks. 
What are some of those questions? First, why do so many patients say they 
do not want to make their own medical decisions? Is the autonomy paradigm 
correct in tacitly assuming that people in fact, at base, truly do want to make 
their own medical decisions? Have the patients who say they do not want to 
make medical decisions been seduced into misunderstanding their own 
preferences? Have the structure of medicine and the arrogance of doctors 
deprived patients of even the will to claim their rightful authority over their 
own decisions? Or, on the other hand, can patients have any substantial and 
persuasive reasons for wishing to delegate authority over medical decisions 
to their doctors, their families, or their friends? 
What, to take a more specific example of a useful question, is the 
relationship between the common perception that people generally want to 
"control" their own lives and the evidence that some patients are not anxious 
to make their own medical decisions? Is that perception correct? Is making 
one's own medical decisions the best way of asserting control? What do 
people mean by control? Is control possible? 
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The data I have surveyed should also lead us to ask whether we have 
framed our questions properly. Bioethics and the law tend to talk about 
medical decisions as though they were sufficiently alike to constitute a single 
category. But might we be well advised to disaggregate that category? Are all 
the decisions we put in it actually medical decisions, as opposed to moral, 
religious, or social decisions? Do patients have any pressing need or technical 
competence to make all the choices that are genuinely "medical" decisions? 
Can we devise more precise categories of questions to fit the probably wide 
range of dilemmas we now describe as "medical questions"? 
The data I have surveyed raise yet another greatly important but insuffi-
ciently explored question: To what extent are patients morally obliged to 
exercise their autonomy whether they want to or not? Patients might 
reasonably suggest that they are exercising their autonomy by declining to 
make their own medical decisions. But it might plausibly be said in response 
that patients have duties-to themselves, to their family and friends, to their 
medical attendants-to make their own decisions. It might be argued that 
patients will best discharge their duty to maintain their own health by making 
their own medical decisions. It might be said that patients should not impose 
the moral burdens of consequential decisions on other people, that patients 
have a duty to chart their own life course and to shoulder responsibility for 
their own welfare. 
Finally, these data raise questions about how people who truly do not wish 
to make their own medical decisions should be treated. How should such 
patients be identified? How can they be distinguished from patients who say 
they do not want to make decisions but at some deeper level actually do want 
to make them? Should patients be encouraged to make medical decisions? 
Educated to make them? Compelled to make them? More broadly, how should 
medical decisions be socially structured to take into account the whole range 
of patient preferences? 
In sum, the empirical data I have reviewed in this Article raise a host of 
problematic and pressing issues, issues which will force us to re-examine the 
autonomy paradigm and the hyper-rationalist assumptions on which we have 
allowed it to rest and to temper and deepen it. The reader is entitled to ask 
what kind of empirical evidence we have about those issues, and how they are 
best addressed. In a subsequent article, currently titled Toward New 
Paradigms for Bioethics: Patients, Doctors, Decisions, and the Practice of 
Autonomy, I will soon take on that enterprise. 
